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Careerist judges and the appeals process
Gilat Levy∗
I analyze how careerist judges formulate their decisions using information they uncover during
deliberations as well as relevant information from previous decisions. I assume that judges have
reputation concerns and try to signal to an evaluator that they can interpret the law correctly.
If an appeal is brought, the appellate court’s decision reveals whether the judge interpreted the
law properly and allows the evaluator to assess the judge’s ability. The monitoring possibilities
for the evaluator are therefore endogenous, because the probability of an appeal depends on the
judge’s decision. I ﬁnd that judges with career concerns tend to be “creative,” i.e., to inefﬁciently
contradict previous decisions.
1. Introduction
 Judging by the surge in recent articles counting the number of times a judge’s opinion or
article is cited (or web-searched), reputation, inﬂuence, prestige, and career concerns are essential
features of the judicial world.1 This is, of course, nothing new; but as ways of measuring features
such as prestige or inﬂuence have became more sophisticated, there has been a renewed interest
in judicial reputation. As Posner (2000, p. 392) writes,
An even more audacious use of citations as a judicial management tool is to grade appellate judges . . . the ranking is a
rough guide to quality, or inﬂuence, or reputation—it is not altogether clear which is being measured.
Judges may care about how others perceive their quality (and accordingly rank them) for two
reasons. First, they may have a human concern about their prestige and inﬂuence. In this sense,
the judicial world is similar to the academic world. The second, more interesting, reason is that the
perception of quality can inﬂuence one’s career. Although judges who have life-tenured positions
need not fear losing their jobs, promotion to a better position in the judicial system may depend
on whether others consider them able. It is a common tradition that appellate judges are trial
judges who got promoted and Supreme Court Justices are judges from lower-echelon appellate
courts. For a judge, these higher-echelon positions can increase both her pay and her possibilities
of inﬂuencing other judges. Thus, trial judges may desire to become appellate judges, and judges
of intermediate appellate courts may aspire to become judges in the courts of last resort.
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Empirical research ﬁnds that the perceived quality of judges plays a notable part in their
promotion. This is, for example, the result in Salzberger and Fenn (1999), who analyze the
promotion probability from the court of appeal to the House of Lords in England. In several
common law countries (such as Canada), judges are appointed by an independent committee
composed not only of legal professionals but also of selected members of the public, whose main
concern may be competence. Even when the judicial appointments procedure is rife with politics
and special interests, as is the procedure for appointing U.S. federal court judges, judicial quality
can still play a big role. For example, Landes and Posner (1975) suggest that politicians have
an interest in keeping an independent judiciary and therefore will not condition promotion on
views.2 Politicians may therefore focus on ability as the main desired trait for a judge.3
In this article I formalize the effect of reputation-seeking behavior on judicial decision
making. In particular, I assume that a judge is interested in creating a reputation for high judicial
ability, which is the ability to interpret the law correctly. Traditionally, political and legal scholars
assume either that judges try to make the right decision, i.e., to interpret the law correctly (the
“legal” model) or that judges have ideological preferences and follow them when adjudicating a
case (the “political” model). But some have taken reputation motives more seriously; Landes and
Posner (1976) conjecture that judges follow precedents to avoid the disutility of being reversed,
whereas both Miceli and Cos¸gel (1994) and Whitman (2000) assume that judges suffer a utility loss
when being overturned by others and gain utility when being cited. As opposed to these articles,
I derive these motivations as well as aversions endogenously, from fundamental preferences.
In other contexts, several articles model careerist decision makers, such as managers or
experts, who use their decisions to signal their abilities to the market (see, for example, Holmstro¨m,
1999; Scharfstein and Stein, 1990; Levy, 2004; and Zwiebel, 1995). However, judicial decision
making has distinctive features. The assumption in the career-concerns literature is that the market
eventually realizes whether managers have made the correct decision. In the judicial system, it
may never be found out whether the judge’s decision is correct or not. This makes the task of
assessing and monitoring the ability of the judge difﬁcult. Nevertheless, it may be possible to
extract more information about the case, and consequently about the judge’s ability, if an appeal
is brought and the case is adjudicated once more. Thus, monitoring the ability of the judge is
endogenous, because whether an appeal is brought depends on her particular decision. The judge
herself can then inﬂuence the ﬂow of information about the case and, incidentally, about her type.
Given the above discussion, I focus the analysis on judicial systems that allow for appellate
review; the judge may be subject to review by an appeals court if the losing litigant believes
that her decision is likely to be reversed.4 An important element of the analysis is that the judge
takes into consideration how her decision affects the probability that the case will be brought
before a higher court. Secondly, I assume an availability of previous decisions in similar cases,
i.e., nonbinding precedent, that can assist the judge in her current decision. As in Daughety and
Reinganum (1999), judges in my model may learn some information from decisions of other
courts, termed “persuasive inﬂuence.”5
These features are incorporated in the following Bayesian signalling model: a judge receives
some private information regarding the application of the law in a particular case. The accuracy
of this information depends on her ability; the more able the judge, the more “accurate” her
2 This accords with the study of Salzberger and Fenn, who empirically show that British politicians (when in
power) do not punish candidates for the judiciary by not promoting them even if these candidates had issued decisions at
odds with the politicians’ ideological views.
3 In times of a divided government in the United States, conﬁrmation gridlock may occur, i.e., the Senate will not
approve judicial candidates suggested by the President if they are perceived as “too ideological.” Thus, competence may
be the only common ground for different politicians to agree upon when justifying promotion. See Maltese (2003).
4 The court system is often modelled as a hierarchy, for example in Spitzer and Talley (2000), Daughety and
Reinganum (2000), Iossa and Palumbo (2004), and and Shavell (1995, forthcoming).
5 Daughety and Reinganum (1999) assume that judges are interested in making the right decision, whereas in
my model judges are careerist. Miceli and Cos¸gel (1994), Whitman (2000), and Rasmusen (1994) also analyze the use
of nonbinding previous decisions by judges and focus on the evolution of the law. My work focuses on the efﬁciency of
judicial decisions.
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interpretation of the law. She then delivers her decision, based both on her private trial information
and on past decisions. The losing party decides whether to bring an appeal, after weighing the costs
of an appeal and its probability of success (the probability of reversal). If an appeal is brought,
an appeals court delivers a reversal or afﬁrmation decision. Social welfare depends positively on
the probability of attaining the correct decision (through efﬁcient aggregation of information) and
negatively on the costs of appeals. A careerist judge, however, is motivated not by social efﬁciency
but by accumulating a reputation for being able. The ﬁrst task of the article is to characterize the
careerist judge’s decisions in equilibrium.
I show that in equilibrium, a careerist judge tends to be “creative,” that is, she tends to
contradict previous decisions more than an efﬁcient judge would do. Contradicting previous
decisions becomes a signal of the judge’s ability, since able judges have accurate information of
their own about the correct interpretation of the law and take less account of previous decisions.
Since this signal increases reputation, other types of judges, and in particular less-able types, tend
to use it excessively and inefﬁciently.6
However, another equilibrium feature is “reversal aversion,” which arises endogenously,
because reversal signals that the judge’s decision was mistaken and reduces her reputation. Thus,
the least-able types realize that if they contradict previous decisions they may be “caught” by
the appeals court. Therefore, less-able judges cannot fully mimic the behavior of the more-able
judges. This allows for an informative equilibrium even when monitoring is endogenous and the
judge cares only for reputation.
The second goal of the article is to assess which institutional features can mitigate the dis-
tortive behavior of the careerist judge. In particular, I consider the effect of different judicial
appointment procedures on reputation concerns and as a result on the efﬁciency of judicial de-
cisions. The procedure of judges’ selection is heavily debated in many countries. For example,
a newly proposed reform in Britain calls for judges to be selected by an independent panel of
experts, most of whom would be drawn from outside the legal profession. This is in contrast to
the tradition so far, in which judges are appointed by the British government after consultation
with existing judges and senior lawyers.7
The model provides a natural way to assess whether judges should be selected for promotion
by senior judges or by nonlegal professionals. In particular, I can differentiate the two selection
systems according to the information held by the evaluator: Supreme Court Justices may ﬁnd it
easier to identify the correct interpretation of the law, as opposed to nonprofessionals who must
rely on information revealed from appeals. This difference may affect the incentives of the judge
and consequently her equilibrium behavior. I therefore compare the equilibrium of the model
when the judge is selected by a committee of experts from outside the legal profession, who
may know what is the right decision only when an appeal is brought (endogenous monitoring) to
the equilibrium of the model when the judge is selected by senior judges or legal professionals,
who, at some relatively small cost, can learn the correct interpretation of the law independently
of appeals (exogenous monitoring).
I ﬁnd that judges behave more efﬁciently when monitoring is endogenous. It may therefore be
welfare improving if judges are promoted by a committee of well-intentioned selected members
of the public who are nonetheless outsiders to the legal profession. The intuition is that an
endogenous monitoring system “punishes” judges who contradict previous decisions by a higher
likelihood of an appeal, and therefore a higher likelihood of being proved wrong by the higher
court. This mitigates the incentive of the less-able judges to mimic able judges who contradict
previous decisions, and reduces the distortion. This cannot happen with exogenous monitoring
because then judges would be proved right or wrong disregarding their decision.
6 The results of the model thus differ from those of Daughety and Reinganum (1999), who predict that judges
may engage in inefﬁcient herding, that is, they excessively follow previous decisions. The reason is that in their analysis,
judges are interested in making the right decision (or what the Supreme Court perceives as the right decision), whereas in
my model judges are careerist and engage in active signalling.
7 The reform is suggested by the Commission for Judicial Appointments, which advises the government on legal
matters.
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The rest of the article is organized as follows. In Section 2 I present the model, a Bayesian
signalling game with incomplete and asymmetric information about the state of the world (i.e.,
the correct interpretation of the law). Section 3 states the main results; I ﬁrst analyze a benchmark
model in which the judge behaves efﬁciently and then investigate the equilibrium behavior of the
careerist judge. A comparison between the two types of judges follows. In Section 4 I analyze the
effect of different judicial appointment procedures on the equilibrium outcomes and also explore
the effect of binding precedent. Section 5 concludes by discussing some extensions of the model,
such as possible concerns of judges to prove, on top of their competence, that they have the “right”
preferences. All proofs not in the text are relegated to the Appendix.
2. The model
 Players and actions. The model describes a two-tier hierarchy of a judicial process, formed
of a lower-court judge and a higher-court judge. The lower court and the higher court may represent
either two appellate courts (intermediate and a court of last resort) or a trial court and an appellate
court.8
The lower-court judge J must make a dichotomous decision, d ∈ {y, n}, namely whether
to accept the plaintiff’s argument (d = y) or to reject it (d = n). Many judicial decisions are
dichotomous in nature. Also, each decision may be viewed as a collection of binary decisions,
i.e., whether some evidence is valid or not. Thus, the model could be applied to any of these
“minidecisions.”9 In any case, the behavior of the careerist judge would be exactly the same if
we assume that her decision is a continuous one, for example if she has to issue a holding that
determines the likelihood of the plaintiff’s argument on a scale from 0 to 1. In equilibrium, due to
career concerns, she would use only two decisions. For clarity of exposition we can then assume
from the start a simple binary decision-making process.
Given the lower court’s decision, the losing litigant L can advance his case to the higher
court by bringing an appeal. Thus, L’s action is to appeal or not. An appeal is costly; the cost is
a random variable c, which is distributed uniformly on the interval [0, 1]. Each side has to bear
c. For simplicity, I assume that the costs are not known prior to the lower-court judge’s decision.
The costs are realized by the litigants only after the decision is made. This assumption implies
that the judge views appeals as uncertain. If c is known in advance, it adds another parameter to
the model, but the nature of the results would still be maintained.
If L brings an appeal, the higher court H adjudicates the case. H must decide whether to
afﬁrm (A) the decision of J or to reverse it (R), i.e., dh ∈ {A, R}. Deﬁne the ﬁnal decision, D,
as D = d if dh = A or if no appeal took place, and D = d ′ for d ′ = d if dh = R. The legal process
ends if no appeal is brought or after the higher court’s ruling.
There is one additional player in the game, the evaluator, E , who represents those that the
judge would like to impress. The evaluator observes the judicial process and forms beliefs on the
ability of the lower-court judge, as explained below. I analyze a one-shot game—the adjudication
of one legal case. I discuss some dynamic issues in Section 5.
 The information structure. The underlying state of the world, w, is initially unknown. It
can be either y or n, with the interpretation that the correct decision is d = y in state y and d = n
in state n. The state of the world w represents the underlying “truth” about the case or the correct
interpretation of the law for the particular case.
In reality, there is not necessarily an “objective” correct decision or interpretation of the law.
The assumption here is just an approximation for the idea that all players would agree, if they
have the same information on the speciﬁc case, on what is the best holding. Actually, the results
8 Daughety and Reinganum (2000) analyze a judicial system in which a trial court is engaged in fact ﬁnding
whereas the appellate court interprets the law. They reject the idea that a trial court is Bayesian and offer an axiomatic
decision-making approach.
9 On the binary nature of judicial decisions, see Kornhauser (1992).
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hold even if players have different views about the correct decision, as long as there is common
knowledge about the preferences of the players.10
Earlier decisions by other courts in similar cases can provide information about w
(“persuasive inﬂuence”). Assume, without loss of generality, that the body of previous decisions
indicates that the correct decision is y and is accurate with probability q ∈ (.5, 1). The prior belief
of the players about the state of the world is therefore that Pr(w = y) = q.
The modelling of previous decisions as imperfect information about the current case has
several interpretations. First, the current case may be only partially similar to previous cases. The
parameter q can measure then the degree of similarity between cases. Second, norms, conventions,
and other conditions may have changed, and q may reﬂect the degree of relevance of past decisions
to the current case.
For simplicity, I assume that the information about earlier decisions is common knowledge.
The players may differ, however, in the amount of additional private information they possess
about w.
The judge’s information. While adjudicating the case, the judge receives a private signal
s ∈ {y, n} about the correct interpretation of the law. The signal may comprise information
that she receives from witnesses and lawyers, as well as some “hard” evidence. The accuracy of
the signal depends on the ability of the judge to interpret the law or to understand the evidence
correctly. Let Pr(s = w | w) = t for t ∈ [.5, 1]. For example, if the judge’s ability is t = .5,
her signal is not informative about the true state of the world, whereas the higher is t , the more
accurate is the signal.
The judge knows her own ability t ; all the other players in the game know neither s nor t .
The other players know only how the signal s is generated given t and w, and the prior distribution
over t , which is assumed to be uniform over [.5, 1].
Given the prior q , and her own information (s, t), the judge forms the following posterior
beliefs, according to Bayes’ rule:
Pr(w = y | s, t, q) =


tq
tq + (1− t)(1− q) if s = y,
(1− t)q
(1− t)q + t(1− q) if s = n,
(1)
where Pr(w = n | s, t, q) = 1− Pr(w = y | s, t, q).
The litigants’ information. The information possessed by the litigants when they decide whether
to appeal includes the judge’s decision (d), the prior (q), and the cost (c). I assume that the litigants
do not have private information about the state of the world. Although this is not very realistic,
assuming that litigants have some information would just complicate the model without changing
the qualitative results.
The higher court’s information. The higher court H knows the judge’s decision (d) and the
prior (q). When the case is brought for an appeal, the higher court also receives some private
information—a signal—about w. For simplicity, I assume that H ’s signal is perfect, i.e., he learns
w and can make a fully informed reversal or afﬁrmation decision once the case is brought for an
appeal. The results are maintained, although the analysis is more complicated, if H receives an
imperfect signal. It is also consistent, within the context of the model, to assume that H is on
average more talented than J , since the higher-court judges are able judges who are promoted
from lower courts.
The information of the evaluator. E’s action is to form beliefs about the expected ability of the
judge, given his prior belief (a uniform distribution). E also knows the prior about the case (q)
10 When there is no common knowledge of preferences, judges may also attempt to signal their ideological views.
The model is robust to the introduction of such concerns if they are weak enough (see the discussion in Section 5).
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and the decision (d) of the judge. Finally, E can glean information from the judicial process. That
is, when an appeal is brought, E can observe dh ∈ {A, R}. This implies that E’s information
about w is endogenous. E can learn w only when an appeal is brought, an event that depends on
the judge’s and the litigants’ behavior. Denote E’s posterior beliefs about t by τ .
The evaluator represents those that the judge would like to impress; it can be the public,
politicians, or the committee in charge of selecting judges for promotion. It is therefore assumed
that these committee members, although smart and well-intentioned, are not legal experts. They
do not have an independent knowledge about the interpretation of the law (or, it is too costly for
them to acquire it) and can learn more about the case only after an appeal, when public opinions
are published by the Supreme Court, for example.
To summarize the information structure, let us reconsider what is a judicial case in the model.
Judicial cases may differ in the model only with respect to the information that they provide. In
particular, they are currently distinguished only with respect to the parameter q, that is, the strength
of previous decisions and evidence applying to them. The model is therefore general enough to
encompass the possibility that the cases selected for trial versus settlement are biased in some
sense. For example, such cases may be characterized by an initial low level of commonly known
information. This would simply be reﬂected by one particular value or a biased set of values
of the parameter q . More generally, cases may also be differentiated through the judge’s private
information, i.e., given a judge of a particular talent, some cases may provide more accurate signals
than others. This can be captured by different functions describing the probabilities of receiving
accurate signals. The model’s results are robust as long as the assumption that more-talented
judges are more likely to receive accurate signals is maintained.
 Objectives. The judge is motivated by proving her competence. She therefore maximizes
the expected beliefs about her ability t as perceived by E , and her objective function is E(τ ).11
Thus, siding with the plaintiff or the defendant is a cheap-talk action for the judge, since it has no
direct bearing on her utility.
The higher court H maximizes the probability that the right decision is made (or, in other
words, that the law is interpreted correctly). The assumption that the higher court is not careerist
is for simplicity, in order to focus on the lower-court judge.
Let the litigants value a favorable decision at 1 and an unfavorable decision at 0. The litigants,
when deciding whether to bring an appeal, evaluate the expected beneﬁts of an appeal, that is,
the probability that the decision d would be reversed, relative to its cost. Denote the probability
of dh = R given a decision d and the information of L by Pr(R | d, q). Thus, the losing litigant
perceives the function max{0, Pr(R | d, q) − c} as his expected interim equilibrium utility and
chooses whether to appeal accordingly.
I do not attribute any utility function to the evaluator. Rather, I assume that E updates his
beliefs about the ability of the judge rationally, using Bayes’ rule. This can be justiﬁed by the
evaluator trying to promote the most-able judges.
Finally, for purposes of welfare analysis, I deﬁne the social utility function. Assume that
society values a correct decision at 1 and places a weight 0 on an incorrect decision. From an ex
ante point of view, the social utility function can be expressed as Pr(D = w)−2θ E(c), where θ ≥ 0
is a parameter capturing how much society cares about costs relative to taking the right decision
and 2E(c) is the expected cost incurred by both sides. Society wishes therefore to maximize the
probability that the ﬁnal decision is correct minus its expected costs. Note that the litigants, who
choose whether to appeal, do not necessarily do so according to the social utility but according
to their own preferences.
 Timing, strategies, and equilibrium. The structure of the game is as follows:
11 In Zwiebel (1995), if a manager’s type is perceived as too low, she is ﬁred, whereas as long as she keeps her job,
her income increases in the perception of the market on her type. Managers in his article thus care about being perceived
as smart beyond some threshold, as well as about increasing their reputations. The possibility of ﬁring seems irrelevant
for the case of life-tenured judges.
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Stage 1: J chooses d ∈ {y, n}.
Stage 2: L decides whether to appeal or not.
Stage 3: If L appeals, H takes an action dh ∈ {A, R}.
Stage 4: E forms beliefs τ on t .
The strategy of J is a decision function σ : (q, s, t) → {y, n}, whereas the strategy of L is a
binary decision whether to appeal given q, d, and c. The strategy of H is dh : {d, w} → {A, R}.
Finally, E has a belief updating function τ : E → [.5, 1], where E represents the information
set of E . In particular, it is the prior uniform distribution over t , and either {q, d} or {q, d, dh}.
The equilibrium concept is that of a perfect Bayesian equilibrium. Beliefs are derived from
the players’ strategies and the strategies are best responses to these beliefs. I focus on informative
equilibria, i.e., equilibria in which the judge’s decision is contingent on her information and ignore
“mirror” equilibria, in which the meaning of the actions is reversed.
3. Results
 Let us consider ﬁrst the actions of H and L in equilibrium. The optimal action of H , who
is motivated by taking the correct decision, is to afﬁrm the decision of J if d = w and to reverse
it otherwise.
Using backward induction, it is now easy to characterize the behavior of the losing litigant
L . Anticipating the behavior of H , L knows that his appeal is successful if the decision is wrong.
L therefore has to form his beliefs about whether d is right or wrong and compare them to the
costs of appeal. To do so, he can update his beliefs about the state of the world given the judge’s
decision. Let qd (σ ) denote the posterior probability, updated by L , that the state of the world is
indeed d , given a decision d , previous decisions summarized by q, and σ , which is the conjecture
of L about the strategy of J . qd (σ ) is calculated as follows:
qd (σ ) ≡ Pr(w = d | q, d, σ )
=
Pr(w = d | q) · Pr(d | w = d, σ )
Pr(w = d | q) · Pr(d | w = d, σ ) + Pr(w = d ′ | q) · Pr(d | w = d ′, σ ) ,
where Pr(w = d | ·) is shorthand for the probability with which w and d are the same and
Pr(d | ·) is the probablility with which some decision d is made by the judge. Thus, the litigants
view decision d as a signal about w with accuracy qd (σ ). Since the probability that a decision is
reversed is the probability that the judge is wrong, the litigants appeal if
1− qd (σ ) > c.
Given any decision d , and the uniform distribution of costs on [0, 1], the probability of
an appeal is 1 − qd (σ ), where in equilibrium, qd (σ ) would be based on the correct conjecture
of the judge’s strategy. In other words, the assumptions about the appeal process imply that in
equilibrium, an appeal is more likely the more the litigants believe that the judge is wrong.12
Finally, we can compute the expected costs of an appeal, which are E(c | c < 1 − qd (σ )) =
(1− qd (σ ))/2.13
 Benchmark: an efﬁcient judge. Before analyzing the equilibrium with a careerist judge,
I analyze the behavior of an efﬁcient judge. This can serve as a benchmark for the analysis.
An efﬁcient judge adjudicates the case with the goal of maximizing social welfare, that is,
12 Note that this type of result would follow also if the litigants would have some private information about the
state of the world.
13 When no confusion occurs, I write qd and drop the conjecture σ .
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maximizing the probability that the ﬁnal decision is correct minus its expected costs. Note that
when the judge is motivated only by social welfare, the evaluator plays no role in the game.
As a ﬁrst step, consider what happens if no appeals are allowed and the decision of the judge is
the ﬁnal decision. When J rules y, her expected utility is the posterior probability that her decision
is correct, Pr(w = y | q, s, t). Similarly, if she rules n, her expected utility is Pr(w = n | q, s, t).
Thus, J decides y for all (s, t) such that Pr(w = y | q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = n | q, s, t) and otherwise
she decides n. By Bayes’ rule, she decides y whenever s = y, or when s = n and t < q . This is
because when s = n and t = q , Pr(w = y | q, s, t) = Pr(w = n | q, s, t), since the judge’s private
information exactly offsets the prior.
This type of behavior can be summarized by a cutoff-point strategy, with a cutoff point
(se, t e), so that when Pr(w = y | q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y | q, se, t e), the judge rules y and otherwise
she rules n, where the index e in (se, t e) stands for efﬁciency (for example, if no appeals are
allowed, then the efﬁcient judge uses the cutoff strategy se = n and t e = q). We can observe a
cutoff strategy in Figure 1, which will accompany us throughout the analysis. The right part of
the graph describes the judge’s decision when s = n, for t ranging from .5 to 1. The left part of
the graph describes the judge’s decision when s = y, and t ranges from .5 (in the middle) to 1 (on
the left). Thus, as we go from left to right, Pr(w = n | s, t) increases, from 0 at s = y and t = 1,
through 1/2 at t = 1/2, and to 1 at s = n and t = 1. The cutoff point, (se, t e), is such that for all
information (s, t) to the right of it, J rules n, whereas for all information (s, t) to its left, J rules
y. Figure 1 describes then an example of a cutoff-point strategy for the judge, with se = n.
I can now analyze the more complicated case in which the judicial system allows for appeals,
as the model assumes. The efﬁcient judge understands the structure of the judicial system and the
appeals process and takes it into consideration. The judge is still interested in making a decision
d that she perceives as accurate, i.e., a decision with a higher Pr(w = d | q, s, t). But she is
also forward looking and has to weigh the costs and beneﬁts of an appeal. If an appeal occurs,
the efﬁcient judge knows that the ﬁnal decision, made by the higher court, is correct for sure.
This induces her to make the decision that is appealed more often, meaning the decision that is
considered less accurate by the litigants. But appeals are costly, and the decision that is more
often challenged also wastes more resources. The next lemma shows that despite this additional
complexity, the behavior of the efﬁcient judge can still be described by a cutoff-point strategy.
Lemma 1. In equilibrium, the efﬁcient judge uses a cutoff-point strategy (se, t e); she rules d = y
whenever Pr(w = y | q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y | q, se, t e), and n otherwise.
Proof. Given the expected behavior of L and H , the efﬁcient judge maximizes Pr(D =
w) − 2θ E(c | c < 1 − qd (σ )). Suppose that the judge rules d. Her expected utility can be
expressed by
Pr(w = d | q, s, t) + Pr(w = d ′ | q, s, t)(1− qd )− θ (1− qd )2.
The ﬁrst expression represents the probability that her decision is correct, and hence the ﬁnal
decision would be correct whether there is an appeal or not. The second expression represents the
probability that her decision is wrong but corrected by the higher court, i.e., an appeal is brought.
The last expression represents the expected costs of the decision (the expected costs of an appeal
multiplied by its probability).
Thus, whenever the judge is indifferent between ruling y or ruling n, the above expression
has to be equal for n and for y. Equating them and rearranging, I get the following condition:
Pr(w = y | q, s, t)
Pr(w = n | q, s, t) =
qy − θ ((1− qn)2 − (1− qy)2)
qn + θ ((1− qn)2 − (1− qy)2) . (2)
When the judge makes her decision, she takes as given the beliefs of the litigants, qy and qn . The
right-hand side of (2) does not depend therefore on (s, t) but on the beliefs of the litigants, who
have no knowledge of (s, t). The judge perceives it as constant for all (s, t). On the other hand,
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by Bayesian updating,
Pr(w = y | q, s, t)
Pr(w = n | q, s, t) =


tq
(1− t)(1− q) for s = y
q(1− t)
t(1− q) for s = n.
(3)
Hence, any different (s, t) yields a different value of Pr(w = y | q, s, t)/Pr(w = n | q, s, t). This
implies that there is (at most) a unique (se, t e) that satisﬁes equation (2). Thus, there is a unique
cutoff point (se, t e), such that the judge rules y if and only if Pr(w = y | q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y |
q, se, t e). Q.E.D.
Equilibrium means that (2) is satisﬁed, subject to 0 ≤ qd ≤ 1 for qd (σ ) = qd (se, t e),
i.e., correct beliefs of the litigants. The parameters characterizing the equilibrium are {q, θ}.
Proposition 1 characterizes the equilibrium in part (i) and presents comparative statics analysis
in part (ii):
Proposition 1 (i) When J maximizes social welfare, there is a unique informative equilibrium in
which se = n. That is, J decides d = y when s = y or when s = n and t < t e(q, θ ).
(ii) The cutoff point t e(q, θ ) increases in q and in θ , t e(q, θ )q→ 12 →
1
2 , t
e(q, θ )q→1 → 1,
t e(q, θ )θ→0 < q , and t e(q, θ )θ→∞ → t˜(q), where t˜(q) is a cutoff point that induces an
equal probability of appeal for both decisions. For all parameters, an appeal is more
likely when the judge contradicts previous decisions.
To understand the intuition for the equilibrium behavior of the efﬁcient judge, let us consider
the case in which θ = 0, i.e., the judge (or society) does not care about the costs of appeal.
Recall that when no appeals are allowed, the equilibrium behavior has se = n and t e = q,
and the judge simply issues a holding for the decision she believes most likely to be correct.
Suppose that the judge were to use this cutoff point when appeals are actually allowed. Then, as
the Appendix shows, qy > qn . That is, the litigants would believe that a decision that follows
previous ones (d = y) is more likely to be correct compared with a decision that contradicts
previous ones (d = n). This is a consequence of Bayesian updating and the prior leaning toward
d = y. As a result, d = n is challenged more than is d = y.
Given the above discussion, a judge with s = n and t = q would rather contradict previous
decisions surely for θ = 0 or more generally whenever θ is low enough. If no appeal is brought,
both decisions, y and n, yield the same expected utility, since the judge believes that each of them
is equally likely to be correct. If an appeal is brought, both decisions yield the same utility as well,
because the higher court makes the correct decision. The tradeoff is solved, however, in favor of
d = n because its probability of appeal is higher, in which case the ﬁnal decision is more likely
to be correct. If such a judge with t = q prefers d = n, the cutoff point then has to satisfy t e < q.
Of course, decisions that are more likely to be challenged are also more expensive, because
appeals are costly. Thus, if costs are important, such a judge opts for the cheaper decision and
rules d = y. In this case, t e > q . The cutoff point therefore increases with θ , which implies that
the judge follows previous decisions more often the higher is θ . Finally, when θ →∞, the judge
cares only about costs and hence the cutoff point must be such that both decisions are challenged
with the same probability.
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 A careerist judge. We are now ready to analyze the behavior of a careerist judge. Note
that from the point of view of L and H , the exact motivation of the judge is not important. L just
conjectures the strategy of the judge, whereas H simply reverses or afﬁrms the decision given his
information about the state of the world.
Recall that the careerist judge would like to impress an evaluator, who assesses the likelihood
that she has accurate information. In particular, she is interested in maximizing the posterior beliefs
τ of the evaluator on her expected ability. Let τ (d, w, σ ) denote the updated belief of E about the
expected type t of the judge, if E believes that J uses some strategy σ , the judge’s decision is d ,
and E were to know the state of the world w. That is, τ (y, y, σ ) denotes the beliefs of E when
J decides y and she is correct. Similarly, τ (y, n, σ ) denotes the updated belief of E when d = y
but E were to know that w = n. And so on.
The evaluator, however, does not observe the state of the world w and has to form beliefs
about it or, in other words, about whether the judge is correct or not. Similarly to the litigants,
the evaluator knows the decision d and the prior q, and has a conjecture about the strategy of
the judge, σ . Thus, when no appeal is brought, the evaluator believes that the judge is correct
with probability qd (σ ). On the other hand, if an appeal is brought, the evaluator can also extract
information about w from the decision of the higher court.
The evaluator will therefore attribute the reputation τ (d, d, σ ) to the judge with the
probability with which he thinks that d = w, i.e., that the decision and the state of the world
are the same. Figure 2 helps to illustrate when this is indeed the case. The tree in the ﬁgure
describes the possible “events” in the game (whether there is an appeal or not, whether the judge
is perceived to be correct or not) and identiﬁes the probabilities of each of these events, as perceived
by the judge herself.
For example, the judge believes that she receives the reputation τ (d, d, σ ) if an appeal is
brought and she is found correct, which happens with probability (1−qd ) Pr(w = d | q, s, t), or if
no appeal is brought, but the evaluator believes that she is correct, which happens with probability
q2d . We can therefore see how each of the judge’s decisions, through the appeals process, induces a
different probability distribution over the information about the state of the world that is available
to the evaluator. This is why monitoring in this model is endogenous, that is, the judge can inﬂuence
the evaluator’s information about the state of the world and consequently about her type.
Using Figure 2 we can express the expected utility of J from a decision d as follows:
((1−qd ) Pr(w = d | q, s, t)+q2d )τ (d, d, σ )+((1−qd ) Pr(w = d ′ | q, s, t)+qd (1−qd ))τ (d, d ′, σ ).
(4)
As seen in (4), the belief of J that she would be perceived correct by E is increasing in
Pr(w = d | q, s, t). Thus, J believes that her own information is correlated with that of E .
The greater the probability she attaches to the event that w = d, the greater the probability she
attaches to the event that E knows that w = d. This feature would discipline the judge to behave
informatively, even if E does not know w for sure, and moreover his monitoring possibilities
depend on the judge’s decision. We can then establish the following lemma (where the superscript
c stands for a careerist judge).
Lemma 2. In equilibrium, the careerist judge uses a cutoff-point strategy (sc, t c), that is, she rules
y if and only if Pr(w = y | q, s, t) ≥ Pr(w = y | q, sc, t c).
The strategy of the careerist judge is similar to that of the efﬁcient judge, who also uses a
cutoff strategy. We therefore have to check which cutoff point the reputation incentives of the
careerist judge induce her to choose. As a ﬁrst step, we can impose more structure on the beliefs
of the evaluator E whenever he conjectures that J uses some cutoff-point strategy σ c = (sc, t c)
and if he were to know w.
Lemma 3. (i) For any action d , τ (d, d, σ c) > τ (d, d ′, σ c).
(ii) If sc = n, then τ (n, n, σ c) > τ (y, y, σ c) and τ (n, y, σ c) > τ (y, n, σ c).
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(iii) If sc = y, then τ (y, y, σ c) > τ (n, n, σ c) and τ (y, n, σ c) > τ (n, y, σ c).
Lemma 3 follows from Bayesian updating. The ﬁrst part asserts that the reputation of J is
higher if she makes the correct decision; this can arise as a signal on ability, since J is more likely
to receive the correct signal when she is able, and her cutoff-point strategy is responsive to her
signal.
In addition, Lemma 3 asserts that if sc = n, the reputation that E attributes to those who rule
n, whether they succeed or fail in making the right decision, is higher than the reputation they
receive when they rule y. Intuitively, when sc = n, J rules n only if t > t c (as in Figure 1). Hence,
E knows that if d = n, it must be that t > t c, whereas if d = y, J may admit a lower type, of
t < t c. The opposite happens when sc = y. In this case, higher reputation is attributed to those
who decide y.
The next lemma helps us to focus our analysis.
Lemma 4. In equilibrium, sc = n.
By part (iii) of Lemma 3, if the evaluator believes that sc = y, higher reputation is attributed
to those who follow previous decisions compared with those who contradict, both when they
are perceived as making the right decision and when they are perceived as making the wrong
one. Moreover, types with s = y have a higher probability of being perceived as making the right
decision when they follow others since most of their evidence indicates that this is the right course
of action. By part (i) of Lemma 3, being perceived as making the right decision also provides a
higher reputation. This implies that the expected utility from ruling y is higher than from ruling
n for these types. Hence no type with s = y can be indifferent and the belief of the evaluator that
sc = y cannot be sustained.
Given that sc = n in equilibrium, we can now ﬁnd t c. At the cutoff point t c, the expected
utility from each decision, as expressed in equation (4), has to be equal. This condition, along
with correct conjectures of J ’s strategy by E and L and rational updating on their behalf, yield
the next result; the ﬁrst part of Proposition 2 characterizes the equilibrium, whereas the second
part provides comparative statics results.
Proposition 2. (i) When J is careerist, there exists a unique informative equilibrium. In the
equilibrium, the judge rules d = y if s = y or if s = n and t < t c(q).
(ii) The cutoff point t c(q) increases with q, t c(q)q→1/2 → 1/2 and t c(q)q→1 → tˆ < 1, that
is, t c(q) is bounded away from one for all q. In equilibrium, an appeal is more likely
when the judge contradicts previous decisions.
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Two types of signals emerge in equilibrium. The ﬁrst signal is proving ability by contradicting
previous decisions. This occurs because sc = n and hence, by Lemma 3, τ (n, n, σ c) > τ (y, y, σ c)
and τ (n, y, σ c) > τ (y, n, σ c). The reason is that in equilibrium, only types with sufﬁcient ability
allow themselves to contradict previous decisions. These able judges may have private information
that outweighs the informativeness of past verdicts. The second signal is proving ability by making
the correct decision. A type who makes the correct decision is more likely to be able. Thus, a
judge who is reversed has a lower reputation than a judge whose decision is reafﬁrmed. At the
equilibrium cutoff point, the tradeoff between these two signals manifests itself: if this type of
judge follows previous decisions, she is more likely to be correct but forgoes the possibility of
using the signal of contradicting. If she contradicts, she receives high reputation for doing so but
is more likely to err and be reversed.
Note that an informative equilibrium exists, even with endogenous monitoring. The least-able
judges are not tempted to contradict previous decisions, although this provides high reputation,
because in equilibrium such an action induces a higher probability of appeal. This is bad news,
since the less-able judges may get “caught” by the higher court. Hence, the less-talented judges
would rather follow previous decisions and be perceived as correct. The more-able judges, on the
other hand, are encouraged to make decisions that are likely to be appealed, since this will afﬁrm
their ability. Even when they contradict precedent, they believe that their decision will not be
overturned, since their own information is relatively accurate. Thus, although a judge’s decision
is a signal of her type and there are no exogenous costs in her utility function for ruling in favor of
the plaintiff or in favor of the defendant, “costs” for making the wrong ruling are endogenously
created in equilibrium.
Proposition 2 also characterizes the judge’s behavior as a function of the parameter q. When
q increases, the beneﬁt from following previous decisions, all else equal, is higher. This is because
the terms of the reputational tradeoff change; when one follows previous decisions, it becomes
more likely that one will receive the (higher) reputation for making the correct decision. Hence,
more types are inclined to follow previous decisions, that is, the cutoff point t c(q) increases.
However, a signiﬁcant number of types choose to contradict previous decisions, as implied
by the result that the value of t c(q) is bounded. In particular, I ﬁnd that t c(q) is bounded by
.625.14 Thus, when q → 1, all types in (.625, 1) make the wrong decision, consciously and
probably inefﬁciently.15 To see why t c(q) is bounded, note that if the evaluator conjectures that
t c(q) is very high, for example t c(q) → 1, then τ (n, ·, σ c) > τ (y, ·, σ c). That is, the reputation
from contradicting is higher than that from following regardless of the state of the world, since
those who contradict previous decisions are only the most-able types, with t → 1. In particular,
τ (n, y, σ c) > τ (y, y, σ c), i.e., even if the judge goes against her predecessors and is found wrong,
her reputation is higher compared to the scenario in which she follows them and is found correct.
Thus, if these are the beliefs of the evaluator, any judge would rather contradict previous decisions.
This implies that such beliefs for the evaluator cannot be sustained, for any q. Consequently, there
is an upper bound on the cutoff point. This feature will allow us to analyze the distortion due to
career concerns, which I do next.
 Contrarian judges. Both the efﬁcient and the careerist judge behave in a relatively similar
manner. That is, they both contradict previous decisions only if s = n and t is high enough, in
particular for t > {t e(q, θ ), t c(q)} for the efﬁcient and the careerist judge respectively.16 I now
compare the behavior of the two differently motivated judges. If, in equilibrium, t c(q) = t e(q, θ ),
then the careerist judge behaves efﬁciently. If t c(q) > t e(q, θ ), it means that the careerist judge
rules y more than the efﬁcient judge, which I term excessively following previous decisions. If,
on the other hand, the equilibrium value admits t c(q) < t e(q, θ ), the careerist judge rules n more
14 This number is computed for the uniform prior distribution of the judges’ types. The model is general and can
be extended to other distributions. In this case, the upper bound would be different.
15 I discuss the inefﬁciency of the careerist judge’s decisions in Section 4.
16 Moreover, it is easy to show that a judge who cares both for efﬁciency and reputation would use a cutoff point
which is in between the respective cutoffs for each type of judge, the efﬁcient and the careerist one.
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than the efﬁcient judge, which I term excessively contradicting previous decisions. The next result
establishes that the judge tends to excessively contradict previous decisions.
Proposition 3. For any q , there exists θ (q) such that for all θ ≥ θ (q), the careerist judge
excessively contradicts previous decisions, that is, t c(q) < t e(q, θ ). Moreover, there exists q¯
such that for all q ≥ q¯ , θ (q) = 0, i.e., the careerist judge excessively contradicts previous
decisions for all values of θ .
Thus, careerist judges tend to be “creative” and to go against their predecessors, a behavior
that induces an underutilization of previous decisions. The result that judges excessively contradict
previous decisions is derived for high-enough values of q or for high-enough values of θ . Two
remarks are due about these parameter values. First, in the context of our model, it is indeed
consistent to assume that θ has high values. If θ is low and deliberation is not costly, the judicial
system should enforce appeals or target almost all cases to the higher court. However, my analysis
focuses on a judicial system that does not automatically transfer all cases to the higher courts;
such a system must therefore embody high costs for a judicial review.
Second, numerical analysis shows that the judge actually contradicts previous decisions
excessively for all other parameters as well. But this cannot be proven analytically because of the
complex nature of efﬁcient decision making in this model.
Figure 3 illustrates the distortion due to career concerns. Recall that the ﬁgure depicts the
information of the judge, so that as we go from left to right, Pr(w = n | s, t) increases. The ﬁgure
shows the area (t c, t e) in which the efﬁcient judge decides d = y whereas the careerist judge rules
d = n.
Intuitively, the careerist judge gains excessive reputation from contradicting previous
decisions, whereas the efﬁcient judge treats each of these decisions symmetrically. Both judges
face incentives to make the right decision, the efﬁcient one because she cares about it directly
and the careerist one because she cares about it indirectly, since it provides higher reputation.
However, the careerist judge has an additional incentive to contradict previous decisions, since
this too provides high reputation in equilibrium.
In more technical terms, the intuition for the result is as follows. For high values of q, the
efﬁcient judge follows previous decisions quite often because it is more likely to be the correct
decision. On the other hand, the cutoff point of the careerist judge is bounded for any q by some
tˆ , as established in Proposition 2. Thus, no matter how high q is, a signiﬁcant portion of types
contradicts previous decisions. For high values of θ , similarly, the efﬁcient judge is inclined to
follow previous decisions, since this is the cheaper course of action. The litigants view it as the
more accurate decision and as a result challenge it less often. The judge who wishes to save on
costs in this case follows others. For the careerist judge, this consideration is irrelevant, since she
does not care about the costs of appeal.
Remark 1. The results reported in Propositions 2 and 3 yield the following empirical predictions.
First, a judge who contradicts previous decisions and is afﬁrmed is the most likely to be promoted.
A judge who follows previous decisions and is reversed is the least likely to be promoted. Second,
a careerist judge tends to contradict previous decisions more than an efﬁcient judge. Thus, if
incentives can be identiﬁed, stronger career concerns imply that when a judge contradicts previous
decisions, she is more likely to be challenged by litigants and also more likely to be reversed.
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In other contexts, several articles, such as Levy (2004), Trueman (1994), and Avery and
Chevalier (1999), analyzed the behavior of careerist experts and showed that experts may behave
inefﬁciently by excessively contradicting prior information. All the articles in this literature assume
exogenous monitoring, i.e., that the evaluator knows what the right decision is independently of
the decision itself. The contribution of the suggested judicial model to this literature is therefore
the analysis of endogenous monitoring. It remains to be seen how endogenous and exogenous
monitoring compare, a task I tackle next.
4. The design of judicial systems
 It is now widely accepted that institutions matter (see, for example, North (1990)). That
is, institutional rules affect individual incentives and, as a result, equilibrium outcomes. Since
careerist judges distort their decisions, we can ask whether other, alternative judicial systems may
change the careerist judge’s incentives and mitigate her distortive behavior, so as to increase social
welfare.
In this section I analyze the equilibrium of the model with a careerist judge, under two
alternative institutions. The ﬁrst one is the practice according to which judges are appointed by
senior judges. This institution alters the amount of information that the evaluator may have when
assessing the judge’s type. The second one is the practice of binding precedent, which I analyze
by changing the preferences of the higher court and hence its actions.
In both cases I maintain the structure of the legal process as outlined in Section 2; speciﬁcally,
following the adjudication of the lower-court judge, the losing litigant decides whether or not to
bring an appeal, and the high court rules upon appeals. This implies that for any of the alternative
institutions that I analyze, the equilibrium is again unique and characterized by a cutoff point for
the careerist judge.
The equilibrium cutoff point is the main determinant of social welfare; it affects the likelihood
that the judge makes the correct decision, the likelihood of an appeal, and its expected costs. Thus,
to evaluate the effect of different institutions on social welfare, I can compute the indirect social
utility as a function of the cutoff, t c(q), and compare the (ex ante) social utility provided by each
judicial institution by simply using the equilibrium value of the cutoff point t c(q) that each of
them generates. Before doing so, I need to identify the relation between t c(q) and social welfare.
Recall that the litigants in the model do not necessarily behave efﬁciently, since they value
costs differently compared with society in general. This implies that the behavior of the efﬁcient
judge is not necessarily optimal in terms of social welfare. It is possible to calculate social utility
and observe that the efﬁcient judge always induces a higher social utility than the careerist judge
does; but because the social optimum may be different from the efﬁcient judge’s behavior, this
still does not directly imply that social utility increases monotonically with t c(q) all the way up to
t e(q, θ ), i.e., the more the careerist judge behaves like the efﬁcient judge. The following lemma
identiﬁes when this is indeed the case.
Lemma 5. Whenever t c(q) < t e(q, θ ) and θ is high enough, social welfare increases with t c(q),
when t c(q) increases up to (and sometimes beyond) t e(q, θ ).
Lemma 5 establishes that for the relevant parameters speciﬁed in Proposition 3, social welfare
increases with t c(q) at least up to t e(q, θ ). In fact, even for low values of θ , social welfare may
increase locally with t c(q). However, Lemma 5 allows us to assess institutions that induce large
changes in t c(q), for the purpose of the analysis in this article as well as for future analysis.
Intuitively, for high-enough θ , the optimal cutoff point from the point of view of society is higher
than t e(q, θ ). This is because the litigants bring too many appeals, and to compensate for that, the
cheaper decision should be made more often. A fortiori, then, whenever t c(q) < t e(q, θ ), and θ is
high enough, social welfare increases if the careerist judge behaves more like the efﬁcient judge
and follows previous decisions more often.
In the rest of this section, I focus therefore on this range of parameters, that is, high-enough
values of θ , and ask whether some alternatives for the judicial system described in this article can
increase the tendency of the careerist judge to follow previous decisions.
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 Who should select judges? The procedure of judges’ selection and promotion is heavily
debated in many countries. In the United States, there is an ongoing debate about public election
versus political appointment of judges.17 In Britain, the Commission for Judicial Appointments,
which advises the government on legal matters, has recently suggested a new procedure for
judicial appointments.18 According to the new procedure, all judges up to the level of the High
Court would be selected by an independent panel of experts, most of whom would be drawn
from outside the legal profession. This is in contrast to the tradition so far, in which judges are
appointed by the government after consultation with existing judges and senior lawyers.
Often, different methods of judicial appointments are considered to have bearing on how
independent judges’ decisions are. Using the model suggested in this article, we can actually
broaden the debate about different appointment procedures and assess the effect of these different
procedures on career concerns and hence on the efﬁciency and quality of judicial decisions.
Indeed, the proposed new system for judicial appointments in Britain seems to accord with
the model analyzed above, in which the evaluator “uses” endogenous monitoring. The evaluator
in the model, who tries to assess the judge’s ability in order to promote the able judges, can only
glean information about the correct interpretation of the law from decisions of the High Court.
Thus, the evaluator can represent a committee whose members have no legal experience. In other
words, the costs of independently learning information about the right decision for this committee
are prohibitive.
On the other hand, in the traditional selection system, lawyers and High Court judges select
whom to promote among lower-court judges. But when High Court judges review a lower-court
judge’s ﬁle in order to decide whether to promote her or not, they may be able to determine
whether she was right or wrong in each case without the need to wait for an appeal. These legal
system insiders may know the correct interpretation of the law even if they do not observe the
result of an appeal, and even if they do not adjudicate the case themselves. More precisely, the
costs they have to incur in order to independently learn the true state should be relatively low.
This, more traditional, promotion system can be represented by a model with exogenous
monitoring, i.e., a model in which the evaluator knows the state of the world independently of the
judicial process, albeit at some cost. We can assume that the motivation to select the right judges
is strong enough to overwhelm the cost parameter, so that such evaluators would always exert the
effort or incur the cost to learn the state.
To compare between the two promotion systems I ﬁrst analyze the equilibrium of the same
model outlined in Section 2, but when the careerist judge is promoted by her superiors. That is,
the only difference is that the evaluator learns the state w independently of the judicial process,
while exerting some cost γ .19 I then compare this equilibrium to the equilibrium in the model
when the careerist judge is selected by the nonexperts committee, i.e., the evaluator knows the
state w only if an appeal is brought (this equilibrium is characterized in Proposition 2).
A ﬁnal note is due before presenting the result. I am comparing the two selection systems only
with respect to social welfare as deﬁned in the model: the costs and beneﬁts from contemporary
judicial decisions. Another relevant dimension is which judges they actually select, in other
words, which system is better at identifying the able judges. These two dimensions relate to
an intertemporal tradeoff, since the incentives of the careerist judge affect social utility from
present decisions, whereas selection of able judges affects social utility from future decisions.
This intertemporal tradeoff is beyond the scope of this article.
How, then, does each system affect the career-motivated judge? Intuitively, the more
information the evaluator possesses, the harder it is for less-able judges to mimic the more-
able judges. The next result characterizes the equilibrium when the evaluator learns w after any
decision d , and shows that it is actually less efﬁcient.
17 For one of many articles on the issue, see Kopecky (1997).
18 See the report in The Observer, August 31, 2003,available at http://observer.guardian.co.uk/uk news/story/
0,6903,1032749,00.html.
19 The cost may vary with the decision. In any case, it has to be small enough so that the evaluator learns the state
disregarding the decision.
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Proposition 4. (i) When E knows w, the careerist judge decides y when s = y or when s = n and
t < t f (q). 20
(ii) The careerist judge follows previous decisions more often when E learns information
from appeals than when E has full information, i.e., t f (q) < t c(q). Social utility is
therefore higher when the evaluator learns information only from appeals.
Increasing the amount of information available to the evaluator is even worse; it further
distorts the decisions of the judge and, given Lemma 5, decreases social utility when γ = 0, let
alone for positive values of γ . The implication of the proposition is that society may be better
off if judges are selected by an independent committee with no legal expertise. In other words,
even if it would have been costless for superior judges or lawyers to learn the information about
the judges they contemplate promoting, social utility (from current judicial decisions) would be
higher if the task of promoting judges were “outsourced” from the legal profession to a committee
of nonexperts.
What is the intuition for this counterintuitive ﬁnding? Career concerns induce judges to
prove their competence by excessively contradicting previous decisions. This becomes a signal,
since only able judges have precise enough information to outweigh past verdicts. But when the
evaluator learns from appeals, an important feature of the equilibrium is that the probability of
appeal is higher after a decision that contradicts previous ones, as compared with a decision that
follows previous ones. Contradicting previous decisions is therefore a “riskier” action for the
less-able types, who are likely to be reviewed and found wrong. Following others becomes then
a relatively “safe action” in equilibrium; less information about the judge’s type is revealed. The
less-able types indeed prefer to hide the truth about their ability, so their incentive to mimic able
judges by contradicting previous decisions is mitigated. With exogenous monitoring, on the other
hand, the evaluator knows the state of the world irrespective of the state and the judge’s decision,
and thus no such monitoring asymmetries occur. The judge in this case is more inclined to use
the inefﬁcient signal of contradicting previous decisions.21
Remark 2. The result of Proposition 4 implies the following empirical predictions. First,
conditional on an appeal, a judge appointed by senior judges is more likely to be reversed when
she contradicts previous decisions than is a judge selected by nonexperts. The opposite holds
when the judge follows previous decisions. Second, a judge appointed by senior judges is more
likely to be challenged by litigants when she contradicts previous decisions, compared with a
judge elected by nonexperts.
 Binding precedent. The intuition gained from the analysis above is that the judge behaves
more efﬁciently if contradiction of previous decisions is penalized by a higher risk of appeal. This
is because it reduces the distortive signalling incentives of the less-able judges. We can therefore
look for institutions that increase the incentives of losing litigants to bring an appeal when the
judge contradicts previous decisions.
For example, if the higher court could commit to a higher rate of reversal when the judge
contradicts her predecessors, litigants could indeed be encouraged to bring an appeal more often
in this case. This suggestion of different legal standards seems to be in accord with stare decisis,
the praxis of the Common Law legal system. The concept of binding precedent indirectly implies
that appeals courts are more likely to reverse a decision that contradicts precedent than one that
follows precedent.
I model binding precedent in the following way; when the judge follows or contradicts
previous decisions and is found wrong, the higher court reverses her decision as before. But
20 The superscript f denotes that the evaluator has full information.
21 In his seminal article about career concerns, Holmstro¨m (1999) exogenously assumes the existence of a “safe
action,” i.e., an action after which the state of the world is not revealed. Similarly, in Zwiebel (1995), actions are exogenously
differentiated according to the information they produce to the market. Here, I derive a “safe action” and a “risky action”
endogenously.
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even when the judge contradicts previous decisions and is correct, the higher court overturns this
decision with some probability. Thus, implicitly, this modelling embodies the idea that higher
courts act in order to preserve the strength of previous decisions; a contrarian lower-court judge
should be reversed even if she is correct.
If the higher court could commit to reverse a decision that goes against precedent even if it
is correct, it would indeed increase the incentives of litigants to appeal when a judge contradicts
previous decisions, as desired. The current speciﬁcation of preferences of the high court judge
would not enable him to commit to such a strategy, because it forces him to make a decision he
perceives as the wrong one.
However, high court judges may be biased in their preferences. In other words, to induce
such practice, one can nominate biased Supreme Court Justices. For example, if Supreme Court
Justices are power seeking and do not tolerate departure from precedents, or have an ideology
that concurs with current precedent, they will indeed ﬁnd it optimal to reverse a contrarian judge.
Formally, consider again the main model outlined in Section 2, but suppose that we can
optimally choose the strategy of the higher court and let φ ∈ [0, 1] denote the probability with
which the judge is overruled when d = n and w = n. The parameter φ can be interpreted as the
degree of bias of the Supreme Court Justices in favor of precedent. When d = n and w = y, the
judge, as before, is reversed with probability 1. No changes are made when d = y, that is, the
decision is afﬁrmed if and only if w = y. Litigants appeal with a higher probability when d = n,
because the probability of reversal is now 1− qn + qnφ. The exercise is therefore to ﬁnd what the
optimal φ is, that is, the optimal bias of the high court, which maximizes social utility.
Proposition 5. When precedents bind,
(i) the careerist judge contradicts precedent more often, that is, t c(q) is lower for any φ > 0
relative to the case in which φ = 0.
(ii) Social utility is higher when φ = 0 than when φ > 0.
Surprisingly, binding precedents do not induce the judge to behave more efﬁciently, and even
have the contrary effect. Intuitively, when previous decisions bind and the judge rules n, she may
be perceived as being correct even if she is subsequently reversed: the evaluator knows that the
higher court also reverses correct decisions. Hence, judges of low ability are induced to rule n
and contradict previous decisions, since the loss from being reversed is not that great. Part (ii)
of Proposition 5 establishes that indeed this practice decreases social utility; it is a combination
of two effects. First, the judge contradicts previous decisions more often, which, by Lemma 5,
decreases social utility. Second, there is a direct negative effect of this practice on social utility.
This is because decisions at the high court are made inefﬁciently and because litigants distort the
appeals process even more when φ > 0, as they are encouraged to bring more appeals.
The result implies that promoting ideologically biased or power-seeking judges to the
Supreme Court may reduce social welfare. Judges who are too conservative and wish to maintain
precedent, or those whose ideological views are in favor of current precedent, will indirectly
provide the wrong incentives for the lower-court judges and induce the latter to further distort
their decisions.
5. Discussion
 I conclude by discussing some of the assumptions of the model, to illustrate the robustness
of its results as well as to highlight some possible extensions.
 Reputation for ideology. There are many ways to think of reputation motives. In this
article I have used ability as a desired trait for a judge. It is also possible that the judge is trying to
prove to some evaluators, such as the public, politicians, or higher-court judges, that she shares
their preferences regarding the interpretation of the law. In such an environment, the one who
promotes the judge, for example a politician, is biased toward one of the parties to the conﬂict,
and judges are promoted if they are considered sufﬁciently biased in this direction as well.
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Such a model is analyzed in Morris (2001), who shows that when these concerns for proving
the right ideology are too strong, an informative equilibrium may not exist. When such ideology
concerns are sufﬁciently weak, an informative equilibrium exists and is characterized by the feature
that decision makers bias their decisions to cater to their evaluator’s preferences. In particular, even
those who do have the “right” preferences would distort their decisions and behave inefﬁciently.
This is because they need to accumulate reputation and hence to distinguish themselves from the
types who have the “wrong” preferences.
Adding such considerations to the model presented in this article would not alter the results,
if these concerns for acquiring a reputation for having the “right” ideology are weak enough. That
is, career concerns (concerns for proving competence) would still induce judges to excessively
contradict previous decisions and to behave more efﬁciently when promoted by outsiders, also
when judges somewhat care to prove that they have some particular views.22
 Dynamics. The model analyzes a one-shot game, i.e., the adjudication of one case. The
main results should also hold in a dynamic context, in which the judge adjudicates a sequence of
cases. When the game is prolonged, more information is revealed about the judge after each of
her decisions. This only induces a different prior belief about the judge’s type after each stage,
and hence the results should be robust to this extension. There are other issues, however, that arise
in a dynamic environment, which I now discuss.
 Reputation incentives for litigants. When the game is repeated, a possible consideration
for litigants is their reputation. If one of them is a repeated player, his actions in the current case
may affect the perception of others about his type. For example, a deﬁant defendant, who appeals
even when the costs of doing so are very high, may signal to future plaintiffs that it is better to
settle than go to court.
In my model, if the plaintiff would have an excessive incentive to bring an appeal (compared
with that of the defendant), the judge’s decision would become more efﬁcient. This is a
consequence of the intuition gained in Section 4; going against precedent (i.e., against the plaintiff),
would become more risky from the point of view of the judge. On the other hand, if the defendant
is a litigant with additional incentives to bring appeals, then the judge would distort her decisions
even more. From the point of view of the less-able judges who wish to hide their type, it would be
even less attractive to follow previous decisions, due to the increased probability of this decision
being challenged. Thus, such dynamic considerations may either ameliorate or exacerbate the
inefﬁciencies identiﬁed in this model.
 Evolution of precedent. We can use the model to analyze the evolution of the persuasive
power of previous decisions. In particular, conditional on no appeal, a careerist judge’s decision,
when added to the body of previous decisions, would increase the persuasiveness of precedent,
compared to an efﬁcient judge’s decision. To see the intuition for this, recall that precedent favors
d = y, whereas the careerist judge’s decisions—any of them—are stronger signals in favor of y;
when the careerist judge rules y, she does it more selectively than the efﬁcient judge. Similarly,
when she rules n, because she does it more often than the efﬁcient judge and for more signals
that favor y, it indicates that the state of the world is y with a higher probability compared with
a d = n ruling of the efﬁcient judge. Thus, previous decisions become more persuasive the more
the judge has career concerns.23
22 Maskin and Tirole (2004) also analyze a model in which a politician is motivated by proving that she has the
right preferences. In their article, a judge is interpreted as an agent who has no career concerns.
23 Kuran and Sunstein (1999), Daughety and Reinganum (1999), and Talley (1999) also discuss precedent in a
dynamic context and in particular its interpretation as an information cascade.
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Appendix
 Proofs of Propositions 1–5 and Lemmas 2–5 follow.24
The following preliminary result, Lemma A1, concerns the Bayesian updating performed by the litigants (and the
evaluator, when there is no appeal). In particular, when J uses a cutoff-point strategy, σ ∗ = (s∗, t∗), we can write qd (s∗, t∗)
in the following way:
qy (n, t∗) =
q
(∫ 1
.5 v f (v)dv +
∫ t∗
.5 (1− v) f (v)dv
)
q
(∫ 1
.5 v f (v)dv +
∫ t∗
.5 (1− v) f (v)dv
)
+ (1− q)
(∫ 1
.5(1− v) f (v)dv +
∫ t∗
.5 v f (v)dv
)
qn(n, t∗) =
(1− q) ∫ 1t∗ v f (v)dv
(1− q) ∫ 1t∗ v f (v)dv + q ∫ 1t∗ (1− v) f (v)dv
,
where f (v) is the prior distribution over t . Similar expressions hold when s∗ = y.
Lemma A1. When J uses a cutoff-point strategy (s∗, t∗), then
(i) qn(n, t∗) increases with t∗ and qn(y, t∗) decreases with t∗;
(ii) qy (n, t∗) decreases with t∗ and qy (y, t∗) increases with t∗;
(iii) qn(n, t∗) > qn(y, t∗) and qy (n, t∗) < qy (y, t∗);
(iv) qy (s∗, t∗) > q and qn(s∗, t∗) > 1− q;
(v) qy (s∗, t∗) > Pr(w = y | q, s∗, t∗) and qn(s∗, t∗) > Pr(w = n | q, s∗, t∗);
(vi) ∃!(s˜, t˜(q)) such that qy (s˜, t˜(q)) = qn(s˜, t˜(q)), where s˜ = n and t˜(q) > q.
For some cutoff point (s, t), deﬁne p˜(d) = (1− qd ) Pr(w = d|q, s, t) + q2d . Thus, when s∗ = n and for some t∗ :
(vii) ∂ p˜(y)/∂t∗ < 0, ∂ p˜(n)/∂t∗ > 0, ∂ p˜(y)/∂q > 0, and ∂ p˜(n)/∂q < 0.
Proof of Lemma A1. The proof, which is purely technical, is provided in the web Appendix.
Proof of Proposition 1. An equilibrium is a solution to
Pr(w = y | q, se, te)
Pr(w = n | q, se, te) =
qy (se, te)− θβ(se, te)
qn(se, te) + θβ(se, te)
, (A1)
where β(se, te) = (1− qn(se, te))2 − (1− qy (se, te))2, given true beliefs of L about J ’s strategy.
Step 1. An equilibrium exists.
Proof of step 1. When se = y,
Pr(w = y | q, y, te)
Pr(w = n | q, y, te) >
qy (y, te)
qn(y, te)
>
qy (y, te)− θβ(y, te)
qn(y, te) + θβ(y, te)
.
The ﬁrst inequality holds for all t > 1/2 and q > 1/2 and follows from plugging in the expressions for qy (y, te) and
qy (y, te). The second inequality follows because qy (y, te) > qn(y, te). On the other hand, when se = n and te = t˜(q) > q,
Pr(w = y | q, n, t˜(q))
Pr(w = n | q, n, t˜(q)) < 1 =
qy (n, t˜(q))− θβ(n, t˜(q)))
qn(n, t˜(q)) + θβ(n, t˜(q)))
.
Hence, there exists se = n and te ∈ (.5, t˜(q)) that supports an equilibrium.
Step 2. The equilibrium is unique.
Proof of step 2. The proof is in the web Appendix.
Step 3. te(q, θ ) increases with θ , te(q, 0) < q, and te(q, θ ) → t˜(q) when θ →∞.
24 Some technical parts of proofs of the results are provided in a web Appendix, available at http://personal.lse.ac.uk/
levyg1/appendixb.pdf.
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Proof of step 3. Since the equilibrium is unique, and for all θ there exists an equilibrium with te < ˜t(q), for
˜t(q) that satisﬁes qy (s, ˜t(q)) = qn(s, ˜t(q)), then in equilibrium, qy > qn , which implies that the probability of
appeal is higher when d = n. Moreover, Pr(w = y | q, n, te)/Pr(w = n | q, n, te) is constant for all θ , whereas
(qy (n, te)− θβ(n, te))/(qn(n, te) + θβ(n, te)) decreases with θ whenever β > 0, i.e., for all te(q, θ ) < ˜t(q), which
along with uniqueness implies that te increases with θ . When θ = 0, then the left-hand side of (A1) equals one when
t = q , whereas the right-hand side is greater than one, by part (vi) of Lemma A1. Hence, te(q, 0) < q . Finally, when
θ → ∞, only costs matter. The judge can be indifferent between the two decisions only if the probability of appeal is
equal for both, i.e., if qy (n, te) = qn(n, te), which implies that te(q, θ ) → ˜t(q).
Step 4. te(q, θ ) increases with q, te(q, θ ) →q→1/2 1/2 and te(q, θ ) →q→1 1.
Proof of Step 4. In the web Appendix I show that te(q, θ ) increases with q. That te(q, θ )q→1/2 → 1/2 and te(q, θ )q→1 → 1
simply follows from (A1).
This completes the proof of Proposition 1. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 2. In an informative equilibrium, some types of J decide n, whereas some types decide y. This implies
that there must be at least one type (s, t) who is indifferent between deciding n and y. That is, the following condition
must hold for some (s, t):
p˜(y)τ (y, y, σ ) + (1− p˜(y))τ (y, n, σ ) = p˜(n)τ (n, n, σ ) + (1− p˜(n))τ (n, y, σ ), (A2)
where
p˜(d) = (1− qd ) Pr(w = d | q, s, t) + q2d . (A3)
Rearranging (A2), and plugging in the expressions for p˜(n) and p˜(y) from (A3), we get
Pr(w = y | s, t, q)
Pr(w = n | s, t, q) =
τ (n, n, σ )(q2n + 1− qn) + τ (n, y, σ )(qn − q2n )− τ (y, y, σ )q2y − τ (y, n, σ )(1− q2y )
τ (y, y, σ )(q2y + 1− qy ) + τ (y, n, σ )(qy − q2y )− τ (n, n, σ )q2n − τ (n, y, σ )(1− q2n )
. (A4)
The right-hand side of (A4) is ﬁxed for all (s, t). As in the proof of Lemma 1, the left-hand side of (A4) changes with
(s, t), and any different (s, t) yields a different value of Pr(w = y | q, s, t)/Pr(w = n | q, s, t). This implies that there is
(at most) a unique (sc, tc) that satisﬁes equation (A4). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 3. (i) τ (d, w, σ c) is an expectation over t , using an updated density function given the observations of
d and w, and the knowledge of the cutoff-point strategy σ , i.e., τ (d, w, σ c) = ∫ 1
.5 t f (t | d, w, σ c)dt . To show that
∫ 1
.5
t f (t | d, d, σ c)dt >
∫ 1
.5
t f (t | d, d ′, σ c)dt,
we can use the MLRP property, i.e., it is enough to show that
f (t | d, d, σ c)
f (t ′ | d, d, σ c) ≥
f (t | d, d ′, σ c)
f (t ′ | d, d ′, σ c)
for t ≥ t ′ with a strict inequality for at least one pair of values t and t ′. It is easy to see that the MLRP is satisﬁed;
whenever J uses a cutoff strategy with sc = n, then
f (t | y, y, σ c) =


2t∫ tc
.5 2dt +
∫ 1
tc 2tdt
if t > tc
2∫ tc
.5 2dt+
∫ 1
tc 2tdt
otherwise,
f (t | n, n, σ c) =


2t∫ 1
tc 2tdt
if t > tc
0 otherwise
and
f (t | y, n, σ c) =


2(1−t)∫ tc
.5 2dt+
∫ 1
tc 2(1−t)dt
if t > tc
2∫ tc
.5 2dt+
∫ 1
tc 2(1−t)dt
otherwise,
f (t | n, y, σ c) =


2(1−t)∫ 1
tc 2(1−t)dt
if t > tc
0 otherwise
implying that
f (t | y, y, σ c)
f (t ′ | y, y, σ c) ≥
f (t | y, n, σ c)
f (t ′ | y, n, σ c) and
f (t | n, n, σ c)
f (t ′ | n, n, σ c) ≥
f (t | n, y, σ c)
f (t ′ | n, y, σ c) for t ≥ t
′.
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The analogous analysis holds when sc = y.
(ii) Similarly to part (i), I can show that when sc = n,
∫ 1
.5
t f (t | n, n, σ c)dt >
∫ 1
.5
t f (t | y, y, σ c)dt
and ∫ 1
.5
t f (t | n, y, σ c)dt >
∫ 1
.5
t f (t | y, n, σ c)dt,
by using the MLRP and in particular by showing that f (t | n, y, σ c)/ f (t | y, n, σ c) and f (t | n, n, σ c)/ f (t | y, y, σ c)
increase with t . This follows directly from the speciﬁcation of the updated density function in part (i).
(iii) The results for sc = y follow from symmetry and part (ii). Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 4. Given (A3), the expected utility from an action d is
p˜(d)τ (d, d, σ c) + (1− p˜(d))τ (d, d ′, σ c).
When sc = y, then τ (y, n, σ c) > τ (n, y, σ c) and τ (y, y, σ c) > τ (n, n, σ c), by Lemma 3. But when sc = y, for any
type s = y, also p˜(y) > p˜(n):
p˜(y) = q2y + (1− qy ) Pr(w = y | q, y, t) > qyqn + (1− qy ) Pr(w = n | q, y, t)
> q2n + (1− qn) Pr(w = n | q, y, t) = p˜(n).
The ﬁrst inequality follows because qy (y, t) > qn(y, t) and Pr(w = y | q, y, t) > Pr(w = n | q, y, t). The second
inequality follows because qn > Pr(w = n | q, y, t). This implies that the expected utility from ruling y is greater than
the expected utility from ruling n for all s = y because τ (y, y, σ c) > τ (y, n, σ c) and τ (n, n, σ c) > τ (n, y, σ c), and
hence no type with s = y can be indifferent. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 2.
Step 1. An informative equilibrium exists.
Proof of step 1. If sc = n and tc = t˜(q), then p˜(y) < p˜(n), while τ (n, n, σ c) > τ (y, y, σ c) and τ (n, y, σ c) > τ (y, n, σ c).
This implies that the utility from ruling n is higher than the utility from ruling y. Along with Lemma 4, this assures existence.
Step 2. tc(q) < tˆ for all q.
Proof of step 2. The proof is in the web Appendix.
Step 3. Uniqueness.
Proof of step 3. Lemma A1 (vii) shows that when sc = n, p˜(y) decreases with t , whereas p˜(n) increases with t and
p˜(y) increases with q, and p˜(n) decreases with q. The proof of step 2 of this proposition (in the web Appendix) shows
that τ (n, y, σ c) is increasing in t , whereas similar analysis holds for τ (n, n, σ c). (This is easy to see, since these are
expectations over t for values of t > tc . Thus, if tc increases, the expectations increase also.) The proof of step 2 also
shows that τ (y, y, σ c) is decreasing in the range [.5, tˆ], and analogous analysis holds for τ (y, n, σ c). Thus uniqueness is
assured, since the expected utility from ruling n is increasing for all t , and the expected utility from ruling y is decreasing
for all t < tˆ .
Step 4. tc(q) increases with q, tc(q)q→ 12 →
1
2 and t
c(q)q→1 → tˆ .
Proof of step 4. p˜(y) increases with q, whereas p˜(n) decreases with q and hence the utility from y increases for all
t relative to the utility from ruling n, which implies that in equilibrium the judge has to rule y more often, i.e., tc(q)
increases. The boundary results are trivial, using the equilibrium condition speciﬁed in Lemma 2.
This completes the proof of Proposition 2. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 3. When the judge is efﬁcient, she uses a cutoff point te(q, θ ) ∈ [.5, t˜(q)]. On the other hand, the
careerist judge uses tc(q) < min{t˜(q), tˆ}. Since te(q, θ ) is a continuous function that increases with q and θ , there exists
q¯ for which te(q¯, 0) = tˆ . Hence, for all q > q¯, tc(q) < te(q, θ ). For other values of q, since te(q, θ ) increases with θ
and converges to t˜(q) when θ →∞, and since tc(q) < t˜(q) and does not depend on θ , there exists θ (q) such that for all
θ ≥ θ (q), the result holds. Q.E.D.
Proof of Lemma 5. We ﬁrst have to deﬁne the expression for social utility, denoted by U (t) (for brevity the index c from
tc is omitted):
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U (t) = q
(∫ 1
.5
2vdv +
∫ t
.5
2(1− v)dv +
∫ 1
t
2(1− v)dv(1− qn(n, t))
)
+ (1− q)
(∫ 1
t
2vdv + (
∫ 1
.5
2(1− v)dv +
∫ t
.5
2vdv)(1− qy (n, t))
)
− θ (1− qy )2
(
q
(∫ 1
.5
2vdv +
∫ t
.5
2(1− v)dv
)
+ (1− q)
(∫ 1
.5
2(1− v)dv +
∫ t
.5
2vdv
))
− θ (1− qn)2
(
q
∫ 1
t
2(1− v)dv + (1− q)
(∫ 1
t
2vdv
))
.
The ﬁrst two lines express the social gain from making the right decision. This happens when the judge makes the correct
decision, or when she does not but an appeal is brought. The remaining expressions measure the social loss from the costs
of appeal. These are paid when an appeal is brought.
I will now show that for high-enough values of θ , in particular for θ > 1/2, ∂U (t)/∂t > 0:
∂U (t)
∂t
= 2q(1− t)qn − 2t(1− q)qy + θ (2t(1− q) + 2(1− t)q)((1− qn)2 − (1− qy )2)
+ 2(2θ − 1)[(1− q)(1− qn)2 − q(1− qy )2].
The ﬁrst three elements capture the change in the utility of the efﬁcient judge when she uses a higher value of t .
Thus, for any t < te (or for any θ ≥ θ (q) deﬁned in Proposition 3), the ﬁrst three elements are positive. Also, for any
t < t˜(q) and θ > 1/2, the last element is positive. Hence, for θ ≥ max{1/2, θ (q)}, ∂U (t)/∂t > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 4. (i) For the proof of the ﬁrst part, see Proposition 1 in Levy (2004).
(ii) The value of t f (q) solves
Pr(w = y | q, n, t f (q))y = Pr(w = n | q, n, t f (q))n + , (A5)
where y = τ (y, y, σ f ) − τ (y, n, σ f ), n = τ (n, n, σ f ) − τ (n, y, σ f ), and  = τ (n, y, σ f ) − τ (y, n, σ f ).
In the web Appendix, I show that at t f (q),
p˜(y)y > p˜(n)n +  (A6)
for p˜(d) = (1− qd ) Pr(w = d | q, n, t f (q)) + q2d , which implies that at t f (q), the utility from y is higher than
the utility from n if appeals are allowed, meaning that the equilibrium solution tc(q) must admit tc(q) > t f (q).
By Lemma 5, this implies that social welfare is lower under exogenous monitoring when γ = 0 and, a fortiori, for
any γ > 0. Q.E.D.
Proof of Proposition 5. (i) I will calculate p˜(n) for φ > 0 and show that it is higher than the value of p˜(n) when φ = 0,
whereas p˜(y) does not change with φ. This means that the utility from n is higher for any t , and thus tc(q) must decrease.
The expression for p˜(n) |φ>0 is composed of two elements. First, there is the probability with which the judge is
perceived correct, in her eyes, if there is an appeal. Appeal occurs with probability 1 − qn + qnφ. If the state is y, or
if it is n, then with probability φ the judge is reversed. In this case, the evaluator believes that the state is actually n
with probability qnφ/(1− qn + qnφ), which is the updated probability given the strategy of the higher court. With the
remaining probability, the judge is afﬁrmed and the evaluator believes then that she is correct with probability 1. The
second element is the beliefs when no appeal takes place, which are qn . The probability of this event is qn(1− φ).
I now show that p˜(n) |φ>0> p˜(n) |φ=0:
p˜(n) |φ>0 = (1− qn + qnφ)(Pr(w = y | q, s, t) + Pr(w = n | q, s, t)φ) qnφ1− qn + qnφ
+ (1− qn + qnφ) Pr(w = n | q, s, t)(1− φ) + qn(1− φ)qn
> Pr(w = n | q, s, t)(1− qn) + q2n = p˜(n) |φ=0
⇐⇒ qn − Pr(w = n | q, s, t) > 0,
which holds by Lemma A1, since qn(s, t) > Pr(w = n | q, s, t).
(ii) Social welfare in this case is a function of both the cutoff point of the judge tc(q, φ) and of φ itself. Therefore,
dU (tc, φ)
dφ
=
∂U (tc, φ)
∂φ
+
∂U (tc, φ)
∂tc
∂tc
∂φ
.
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From part (i) and Lemma 5, we know that (∂U (tc, φ)/∂tc)(∂tc/∂φ) < 0. It is left to check that ∂U (tc, φ)/∂φ < 0. But
this is trivially the case for high-enough θ because the litigants, inefﬁciently, bring more appeals the higher is φ, and
moreover, the high court does not make the right decision when φ > 0. Q.E.D.
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